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Abstract
This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity
and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show
the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces
that prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then
show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible, but only when firms
adopt inventory controls (sales limit restrictions) and demand becomes more
inelastic over time. Therefore, in addition to being useful to manage demand
uncertainty, we show that inventory controls are also a tool to soften price
competition. We discuss model extensions, including product differentiation,
aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons.
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Introduction

In many market settings, firms commit to capacities and then sell their inventories
to consumers over time. Classic examples include selling seats on a plane or train,
or selling rooms at a hotel or on a cruise ship. In these industries, capacity is fixed,
and firms frequently adjust their prices over time both in response to demand
shocks that affect scarcity and to changes in the overall price sensitivity of arriving consumers. Sophisticated pricing systems, commonly referred to as revenue
management, automate this process. Although there exists a substantial literature
in economics, marketing, and operations research on the design, implementation,
and consequences of using these pricing systems, much of this existing research
focuses on a monopolist facing uncertain demand. It is unclear how these insights
carry over to the common setting where firms compete for sales and have the
incentive to undercut each others’ ability to price discriminate before the sales
deadline.
In this paper, we extend the seminal research by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
and Davidson and Deneckere (1986) on sequential quantity-price games to multiple sales periods. We show that when firms first choose capacity and then compete
for customers over time, strong competitive forces exist that prevent firms from
utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. This occurs even in situations where
this form of price discrimination would clearly increase industry profits. We
highlight two main contributions. First, we show that equilibrium prices are flat
or uniform over time, unless firms make additional commitments. This occurs
because the existence of multiple sales periods creates a costless arbitrage opportunity in which a capacity-constrained firm can increase its profits by shifting sales
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in periods with price sensitive consumers to its capacity-constrained rivals. This
strategy allows the firm to increase its market share in periods with price insensitive consumers. Other firms have similar strategic incentives. In the absence
of additional commitments, these strong competitive forces lead to intense price
competition that prevent firms from setting increasing prices when demand becomes less price sensitive over time. It also prevents firms from setting decreasing
prices when demand becomes more price sensitive over time. Second, we show
that intertemporal price discrimination is possible when firms adopt inventory
controls, but only if demand becomes more inelastic over time. Inventory controls are sales limits that prevent firms from selling too much capacity at a given
price. These controls are a key feature in the revenue management systems that
have been adopted by airlines, cruises, hotels, trains, and entertainment or sports
events. Therefore, in addition to being a beneficial tool to manage remaining inventory when demand is uncertain, we identify another benefit of using inventory
controls—they can increase industry profits by softening price competition. We
discuss extensions of our baseline model that reflect market characteristics in the
aforementioned examples, including product differentiation, aggregate demand
uncertainty, discounting, and longer sales horizons.
The baseline model in Section 2 considers an oligopoly setting where firms sell
a homogeneous good. Firms first choose capacity—an output constraint that is
common across selling periods—and then compete in prices in a series of sequential markets. In each period, firms’ remaining capacities are observed, and then
firms simultaneously choose prices, and consumers make their purchase decisions.
After the final period, unsold inventory is scrapped with zero value, e.g., tickets
for a concert that has already happened no longer hold any value. For tractability
reasons, the baseline model considers two advance-purchase sales periods. We
2

assume that there are a continuum of consumers, some of whom arrive in each
one of two sequential markets. We assume that consumers assigned to the early
market can wait and purchase in the later market. We also allow the elasticity of
demand to change over time. We emphasize the case in which demand becomes
more inelastic for two reasons. First, it is clear that a monopolist would set increasing prices in this case, and second, prices tend to rise in several industries in
which firms have fixed inventory, adjust prices over time, and face competition,
e.g., see Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2012) and Siegert and Ulbricht (2020) for
descriptive analyses on airline pricing.
Because firms are free to sell their capacity in any time period, our result may
not seem surprising. However, if firms choose output each period as opposed
to prices (and prices clear the market each period), then firms would equalize
marginal revenues across time and not equalize prices. One of our contributions
is showing that our sequential quantity-price game is different from the sequential
capacity-output model, even though the two models always coincide under our
assumptions when there is only one sales period. An additional contribution is
characterizing sufficient conditions under which uniform prices arise as the unique
pure-strategy equilibrium outcome. Although we find that uniform pricing arises
whether the elasticity of demand is increasing or decreasing over time, we also
show there exist important asymmetries in the sufficient conditions that guarantee
uniform pricing in these two scenarios.
We then enrich the model by allowing firms to implement inventory controls
each period in conjunction with price setting. In this model, firms choose an initial
overall capacity limit and then simultaneously choose sales (or quantity) limits
and prices in each period. We show there exist equilibria in which prices are
increasing when demand becomes more inelastic over time. Price discrimination
3

is possible because inventory controls protect a firm from rivals who want to
exploit the arbitrage opportunity by increasing its market share in early periods
with more elastic demand and decreasing its market share in late periods with
less elastic demand. Because deviating to a higher price in the early period is not
profitable with inventory controls, firms instead choose to sell at Cournot prices in
each period, thereby facilitating intertemporal price discrimination and increasing
profits. On the other hand, we also show that inventory controls are ineffective
at facilitating price discrimination when demand becomes more elastic over time.
This is for two reasons. First, a rival can increase its market share in early, more
profitable periods by cutting price—inventory controls do not protect the firm
because they only create an upper bound on sales (they cap total sales in early,
low-price periods, but do not put a floor on sales in early, high-price periods).
Second, forward-looking consumers constrain firms’ early-period pricing because
they can choose to purchase in the later period.
Our results provide an additional rationale for the widespread use of inventory
controls in the aforementioned industries. As detailed in Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley,
Schwieg, and Williams (2021), firms in capacity-constrained industries dynamically release inventory over time, thus preventing them from selling all remaining
inventory at a single price. For example, customers shopping for airline tickets
may observe a warning that there are “5 seats left” at a particular price.1 This occurs because prices have corresponding sales-quantity limits. If a firm attempted
to shift price-sensitive consumers to its rivals, inventory controls will cause rival
firm prices to rise as units are sold, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of the
strategic force explored in this paper. In the previous airline example, at most five
1

Examples can be viewed at https://travelupdate.com/5-seats-left-booking-flights/, accessed
10/5/2021.
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seats would be sold at the current price instead of potentially the entire plane. Our
analysis suggests it is profitable for firms to adopt inventory controls because they
soften price competition. Indeed, managers at American Airlines describe inventory controls as a "strong competitive tool" that determines the "revenue-mix", or
who purchases and at what prices (Smith, Leimkuhler, and Darrow, 1992).
Finally, we discuss model extensions. First, we consider product differentiation. We argue that prices are no longer uniform across time because firms are
unable to shift all of their sales to rivals using very small price changes. However,
the strategic incentives explored in our baseline model are still present. We use an
example to show that products must be highly differentiated in order for prices to
increase substantially over time absent firms using inventory controls. Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that the adoption of inventory controls is most valuable
when products are close substitutes. We also show how our results can generalize
to many periods with additional assumptions. Finally, we discuss discounting,
models with aggregate demand uncertainty, and specify alternative ways to model
inventory controls.

1.1

Related Literature

This paper contributes to several strands of literature in economics, management,
and marketing. First, we contribute to a large literature on price competition with
capacity constraints (Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Allen and Hellwig, 1986; Osborne
and Pitchik, 1986; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986; Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar,
2009). Our work complements Van den Berg, Bos, Herings, and Peters (2012), who
consider a similar model setup but do not allow firms to shift low-priced sales to
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rivals.2
Second, we analyze intertemporal price discrimination. Stokey (1979) is a seminal paper that shows that intertemporal price discrimination is not always feasible
in the monopoly setting.3 In recent theoretical work, including Öry (2016) and
Dilmé and Li (2019), forward-looking buyers who can postpone their purchases
constrain the a monopolist’s ability to discriminate. These so called Coasian forces
are also present in our model when demand becomes more elastic over time. When
demand becomes more inelastic over time, consumers cannot make themselves
better off by postponing their purchases because they face increasing prices. Here,
competition is a key constraint on price discrimination—the temptation to arbitrage differences in rivals’ prices can be so strong that it prevents intertemporal
price discrimination.4
Another reason that prices may adjust over time is that consumers may learn
more about their preferences as the time of consumption approaches, and firms
may set price accordingly. When consumers learn over time, monopolists may be
able to perfectly price discriminate (Akan, Ata, and Dana, 2015; Ata and Dana,
2015). In competitive markets, learning may result in prices that increase over time
Dana (1998). Consumers may also learn about their preferences through repeat
purchase, and learning through repeat purchase also interacts in important ways
with competition, particularly when consumers are forward looking (Villas-Boas,
2004). However, in this paper we assume that consumers know their preferences
upon arrival and we abstract from repeat purchases. Therefore, these effects are
2

See Benassy (1989) and Reynolds and Wilson (2000) for related pricing games, Aguirre (2017)
for a related quantity games, and De Frutos and Fabra (2011) for a related price and capacity game.
3
Nair (2007) and Williams (2021) conduct empirical studies on intertemporal price discrimination where prices rise (fall) over time.
4
See also Champsaur and Rochet (1989).
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not present.
The marketing literature has also emphasized strategies for shifting demand
when capacity is fixed, particularly service industries (Shugan, 2002). While our
model does not have have multiple consumption periods, this issue is relevant for
the hotels as well as other industries where capacity is constrained. Firms often
have strong financial incentives to use price and non-price strategies to smooth
demand variation, particularly when it is costly to shift supply, and including when
the demand variation is unpredictable (Shugan, 2002; Dana, 1999). Non-price
strategies may also be available, including advertising (Horstmann and Moorthy,
2003) and the timing of product introductions (Radas and Shugan, 1998).
Finally, we analyze inventory controls. Research in operations management
has shown that inventory controls can be an effective tool to manage demand
uncertainty, but this research abstracts from their ability to increase profits with
known demand in the presence of competition.5

2

The Model

Consider an oligopoly with n firms selling a homogeneous good to a continuum
of consumers in a series of advance-purchase sales markets. For tractability, we
consider just two selling periods, or stages. Some consumers arrive in Stage 1
while others arrive in Stage 2. We assume that consumers who arrive earlier can
purchase in either Stage 1 or Stage 2, while consumers who arrive later can only
purchase in Stage 2. Consumption takes place afterwards, in Stage 3.
We assume that consumers know their valuations for the good when they
arrive. The valuations of consumers who arrive early do not change if they wait
5

See Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006) and McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) for overviews of this work.
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to purchase later.6 Although we do not explicitly consider discounting, all of
our results generalize since we can interpret all prices as prices in the units of
Stage 3 dollars. That is, we treat all payments as if they are made at the time of
consumption.
We represent preferences using market demand functions, denoted by D1 (p)
and D2 (p), respectively. We assume these functions are strictly decreasing and
twice differentiable. We let P1 (q) and P2 (q) denote the inverse demands associated
with D1 (p) and D2 (p), respectively, and we assume that P00t (q)q+2P0t (q) < 0, ∀t = 1, 2.
Throughout the paper, we use pit to denote Firm i’s price; we use pt to denote the
vector of all firms’ prices; and we use pt to denote the Stage t price when all Stage
t transactions occur at this price. We use −i to denote firms other than i. We let
Dtot (p) = D1 (p) + D2 (p) denote the total demand when prices are the same in both
stages and Ptot (q) denote the associated inverse total demand when q units of total
output are sold at a uniform price.
The cost per unit of capacity for all firms is c. We make the simplifying
assumption that the marginal cost of production for each unit sold is zero (all the
costs of production are associated capacity, not sales). We let ηt (p) = D0t (p)p/Dt (p)
denote the price elasticity of demand in Stage t.
Each firm’s strategy consist of three choices, capacity and two prices. The game
proceeds in three stages (see Figure 1). First, in Stage 0, firms simultaneously
choose their capacities, denoted by Ki ≥ 0 for firm i or by the vector K. Then,
in Stage 1, firms simultaneously choose prices (p1 ), and consumers who arrive in
Stage 1 then make their purchase decisions. Sales, q1 ≥ 0, are constrained only
6

Alternatively, following Dana (1998) and Akan, Ata, and Dana (2015), we could have assumed
that some consumers do not learn their demands until Stage 2 and then make additional mild
assumptions that imply that these consumers would never want to purchase in Stage 1 even if they
were able to.
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by the firms’ initial capacities, K1 = K in Stage 1. Sales in Stage 2 are constrained
by firms’ residual capacities, K2 = K − q1 ≥ 0. That is, the capacity constraint
is common across stages. Note that we are making the natural, but empirically
strong, assumption that the firm cannot refuse sales at its Stage 1 price in order
to reserve more of its inventory for Stage 2. This is important because of the
strategic uncertainty about rival firms’ prices. We relax this assumption in Section
5 where we introduce inventory controls. In Stage 2, firms simultaneously choose
prices (p2 ), and consumers who arrive in Stage 2 (or waited) make their purchase
decisions. Capacity not used in Stage 2, K2 − q2 , has zero value (it is scrapped at
no cost). We ignore discounting.
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Figure 1: Timing of the Game

2.1

Pure Strategies and Residual Demand

Quantity-price games, including Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and
Deneckere (1986), are known to have mixed strategy equilibrium off of the equilibrium path, which makes them difficult to solve. Because we have multiple
pricing periods, characterizing the equilibria of the pricing subgame is consider9

ably more challenging. To simplify our analysis, we assume that capacity costs are
sufficiently large so that all of the pricing subgames have pure-strategy equilibria.
In the Appendix, we derive a lower bound on capacity costs that implies that
in every equilibrium, total industry capacity is less than argmaxq P2 (q)q. In other
words, no firm can profit by holding back some of its capacity in the final period
of the game. Let cL denote this lower bound. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The cost of capacity satisfies c ≥ cL .
This assumption reflects industries such as airlines and hotels, where capacity
costs are high. Note that Assumption 1 is only a sufficient condition. It may be
possible that smaller capacity costs generate pure strategy equilibria. Our results
may hold even when some of the off-the-equilibrium-path pricing subgames do
not have pure strategy equilibria. Alternative assumptions also give the same
results, such as assuming demand is isoelastic (see Madden 1998).
In addition to capacity costs, we must define the how capacity is rationed, particularly when firms set different prices. Throughout the paper, we accommodate
multiple rationing rules, stated below.
Assumption 2. Rationing is either efficient or proportional.


−i
,
K
We define residual demand for firm i in stage t as RDt pit ; p−i
t
t , which can
be written explicitly as
−i
RDt (pit ; p−i
t , Kt )

=

Dt (pit )

−

X
j:
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j
pt <pit

j

Kt , ∀t = 1, 2,

(1)

under the efficient rationing rule, and as


X K j 

t 
−i
i 
1 −
 , ∀t = 1, 2,
RDt (pit ; p−i
t , Kt ) = Dt (pt ) 

j 

D
(p
)
t t
j:p j <pi

(2)

under the proportional rationing rule.
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A Benchmark Result

Before characterizing the equilibrium of our game, we consider a useful benchmark
result. Suppose that firms are constrained to set the same price in Stage 1 and Stage
2—that is, pi1 = pi2 , ∀i. Then, in equilibrium, K must be the symmetric Cournot
output, or the Cournot output when demand is D1 (p) + D2 (p). This is because
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the equilibrium price in the pricing subgame is
always equal to the market clearing price, so the Stage 0 capacity game reduces
to a standard Cournot model. We formalize this idea in the following lemma. All
proofs, except the proof of Lemma 3, are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. When firms are constrained to choose the same price in Stage 1 and Stage
2, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the equilibrium price in every Stage 1 and Stage 2
P
pricing subgame is the market-clearing price defined implicitly by D1 (p) + D2 (p) = i Ki .
The equilibrium capacities chosen in Stage 0 are the Cournot capacities associated with
demand Dtot (p) = D1 (p) + D2 (p).
Note that as the number of firms goes to infinity, the price converges to the cost
of capacity, c. Therefore, we refer to c as the competitive price.
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4

Equilibrium Characterization

We now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the full model described in
Section 2, starting with Stage 2 and working backwards to Stage 0.

4.1

The Final Pricing Period

We begin by characterizing equilibrium prices in the final pricing period (Stage 2).
Lemma 2 states that in every Stage 2 subgame, firms set prices to clear the market.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, in any subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
three-stage game, the price in the second selling period clears the market.
Assumption 1, which implies Lemma 2, is important because it allows us to
easily characterize all of the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the pricing
subgame.

4.2

No Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Symmetric Equilibria

We define a uniform-price equilibrium to be an equilibrium in which all transactions occur at the same price. That is, either prices are equal across time (so
transactions are necessarily at the same price), or prices decline over time, but all
consumers purchase in Stage 2 at the same price. We say that an equilibrium is
symmetric as long as the transactions prices in each stage are the same for all firms.
We say that the equilibrium is unique if the prices that consumers pay, and the
capacities that firms choose, are uniquely defined.
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Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the
pricing subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that a subgame perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame exists
in which p1 < p2 . If firm i deviates to a price p̂ > p1 , but arbitrarily close to p1 , in
Stage 1, then its sales would be the larger of 0 and RD1 (p̂; p1 , K−i ). If the residual
demand is zero then Stage 1 sales are unchanged, equal to D1 (p1 ), and the Stage 2
market clearing price is unchanged by Lemma 2. This implies that firm i’s profits
are strictly higher, which is a contradiction. If the residual demand is positive, then
P
j
RD1 (p̂; p1 , K−i
j,i K1 is arbitrarily close to D(p1 ) for both rationing rules because
1 )+
p̂ is arbitrarily close to p1 , so the market clearing price in Stage 2 is arbitrarily close
to p2 . This implies that firm i’s profits are strictly higher following its deviation,
which is a contradiction.
Suppose that a subgame perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame exists in
which p1 > p2 . In this case, since consumers can choose to wait, there are no
transactions in Stage 1, and all transactions take place in Stage 2 at a price p2 . This
implies that all transactions prices are the same. That is, there must also exist
a payoff-equivalent equilibrium in which the Stage 2 prices are unchanged, but
pi1 = p2 for all i.7 
Lemma 3 demonstrates the strong competitive forces in the model. If prices
changed over time (in a symmetric equilibrium), individual firms could change
their prices in order to increase their sales in the higher-priced period. Prices
cannot rise over time because firms can raise their Stage 1 price to shift sales to
7

Note that even if consumers could not wait, which we think is unrealistic, any firm with strictly
positive sales in Stage 2 could deviate to a price p̂ < p1 that is arbitrarily close to p1 . Total Stage 1
sales would be arbitrarily close to D(p1 ) under either rationing rule because p̂ is arbitrarily close to
p1 . Then the market clearing price in Stage 2 is arbitrarily close to p2 , which implies the deviation
is profitable. So, the proof does not depend on our assumption that consumers can wait.
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rivals in Stage 1 and thereby sell more in Stage 2. Similarly, prices cannot fall over
time for the same reason. However, recall that even a monopolist cannot benefit
from declining prices because we assumed that consumers can wait until prices
are lower to make their purchases. Therefore, there are two reasons that prevent
prices from declining over time.
Although symmetric equilibria must have uniform prices, asymmetric equilibria may also exist. In the following subsections, we characterize reasonable
conditions under which only symmetric equilibria exist.

4.3
4.3.1

Decreasing Elasticity of Demand
The Pricing Subgame

In Proposition 1, below, we show that there are two types of pure-strategy subgame
perfect equilibria in the pricing subgame when demand becomes more inelastic
over time. Since the market clears in Stage 2 by Lemma 2, any uniform-price
P
equilibrium must satisfy D1 (p∗ ) + D2 (p∗ ) = i Ki . The uniform price is unique by
Lemma 1, though consumption can take place in both periods or just in Stage 2.
In an asymmetric-price equilibrium, a single firm sells in Stage 1. The Stage
1 price is lower than the Stage 2 price, and all other firms sell only in Stage 2.
Intuitively, the firm that sells in Stage 1 is pushing up the price in Stage 2 by
limiting Stage 2 capacity. So in a sense the firm is providing a public good. It
follows that only one firm sets a low Stage 1 price and the others free ride.
Let Firm i be the firm that sells in the Stage 1, and let pi1 and qi1 denote its
first-period price and quantity, where
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pi1




 
X i
K − D1 (p) Ki − D1 (p) ,
= argmax pD1 (p) + P2 
p∈[P1 (Ki ),∞]

(3)

i

or, equivalently,


X

 


Ki − q Ki − q .
qi1 = argmax P1 (q)q + P2 
q∈[0,Ki ]

(4)

i

Firm i’s first-period sales do not exceed Ki , and the second-period price is higher
than pi1 and is given by



X i

i
P2 
K − D1 (p1 ) .

(5)

i

Note that Proposition 1 holds regardless of whether or not the elasticity is
decreasing.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame is either a uniform-price equilibrium or an asymmetric-price
equilibrium satisfying Equations (3), (4) and (5).

When a uniform-price equilibrium

exists, it is the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. When a uniform-price
equilibrium does not exist, then at least one, and at most n, asymmetric-price equilibria
exist.
Intuitively, asymmetric-price equilibria exist because a lower price in Stage 1
increases sales in Stage 1, leading to less output sold and a higher price in Stage
2. A firm can increase its profit in this way only if the elasticity is decreasing (so
increasing prices is desirable) and only if it has sufficient capacity to meet all of
the demand in Stage 1 plus enough additional capacity to profit from selling at the
higher price in Stage 2. Other firms free ride and sell only in Stage 2 at the higher
price.
15

Asymmetric-price equilibria are more likely to exist than uniform-price equilibria when one firm chooses significantly more capacity than its rivals in Stage 0.
The incentive to deviate to a lower price is increasing in the deviating firm’s capacity, decreasing in the rival firms’ capacities, increasing in the relative elasticity
of Stage 1 demand, and decreasing in the relative magnitude of Stage 1 demand.
Like Lemma 2, Proposition 1 highlights the pressure on competing firms to
equalize prices across periods. Unless one firm is sufficiently large and can unilaterally implement an asymmetric-price equilibrium, the equilibrium is a uniformprice equilibrium. Although Proposition 1 shows that asymmetric-price equilibria
of the pricing subgame may exist, we now show that under relatively mild additional assumptions, the uniform-price equilibrium is unique even when the
elasticity of demand is decreasing.
Importantly, we show in the next section that when firms choose their capacities
optimally, they will choose symmetric capacities which results in a uniform-price
equilibrium in the pricing sub-game.
4.3.2

Initial Capacity Choice

We now consider the full game, which includes Stage 0. We make an additional
assumption (Assumption 3).
Assumption 3. The elasticity of demand satisfies
η2 (p) 1
> , ∀p > 0.
η1 (p) n
This assumption implies that the elasticity of demand is not decreasing too
quickly. Intuitively, we need this assumption in order to guarantee that a firm
does not want to choose so much capacity that it can supply all of demand at a
16

lower price in period 1 and still have sufficient remaining capacity to make profits
selling at higher price in period 2 (even though its rivals are selling all of their
capacity in period 2). Assumption 3 is a sufficient condition that implies such
deviations are not profitable.
Using this additional assumption, we now show in Proposition 2 below that intertemporal price discrimination is impossible in oligopoly markets when demand
becomes more inelastic over time.
Proposition 2. If demand becomes more inleastic over time, then under Assumptions 1,
2 and 3, the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game is a
uniform-price equilibrium. The equilibrium capacity and profits are equal to the Cournot
capacity and profits given demand D1 (p) + D2 (p).

4.4

Increasing Elasticity of Demand

We now establish results under the case in which demand becomes more elastic
over time. In this case, consumers have an incentive to wait to purchase. These
Coasian forces can prevent even a monopolist from using intertemporal price
discrimination.
Proposition 3 establishes that prices are always uniform in the pricing subgame
when demand becomes more elastic over time.
Proposition 3. When demand is constant or becomes more elastic over time, then under
Assumptions 1 and 2, the uniform-price equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy subgameperfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame.
This result holds for two reasons. First, the same competitive forces that
constrain firms when the elasticity of demand is increasing constrain firms when
17

the elasticity of demand is decreasing. That is, firms want to shift lower priced
sales onto their rivals. Second, price discrimination is also constrained by the fact
that consumers can wait and purchase in Stage 2 if prices decline over time.
4.4.1

Initial Capacity Choice

We now consider the full game, including the initial capacity choice.
Proposition 4. When demand is constant or becomes more elastic over time, then under
Assumptions 1 and 2, the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
full game is a uniform-price equilibrium. Equilibrium capacity and profits are equal to the
Cournot capacity and profits given demand D1 (p) + D2 (p).
Proposition 4 follows immediately from previous results. When demand becomes more elastic over time, Assumption 3 is always satisfied, so the Cournot
model is even more robust to breaking up demand into multiple pricing periods.
However, this is largely because consumers have the option to wait.8

5

Inventory Controls

In the previous section, we showed that firms choose capacity equal to the Cournot
output and set the same price in both pricing periods. They set the one-shot
Cournot price and quantity, even when profits would be higher with intertemporal
price discrimination.
We now show that inventory controls allow firms to price discriminate and
earn higher profits, but only if demand becomes more inelastic over time. We
8

In an earlier version of the paper, we assumed that consumers did not have the option to wait
and showed that a uniform-price equilibrium may not always exist under increasing elasticity of
demand.
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model inventory controls as an upper bound on the quantity sold each pricing
period, and we allow firms to set inventory controls when they set their price. So
firms first choose their initial capacity, and then, in each of the subsequent pricing
periods, simultaneously choose both their price and an inventory control. For two
pricing periods the timing is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Timing of the Game with Inventory Controls
Inventory controls guarantee that if a rival deviates to a higher price in Stage 1,
then its own sales will not increase. Inventory controls place a cap on sales but not
a floor. Hence, inventory controls highlight another natural asymmetry between
increasing and decreasing elasticity of demand: Inventory controls can prevent a
rival from increasing a firm’s sales by deviating to a higher price, but they cannot
prevent a rival from lowering a firm’s sales by deviating to a lower price.
Proposition 5. If demand becomes more inelastic over time, then under Assumptions 1,
2 and 3, a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the model with inventory controls exists
in which all firms set the Cournot price and set inventory controls equal to the Cournot
quantity in each selling period. Profits are strictly higher in this equilibrium than in the
uniform-price equilibrium.
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In the equilibrium described in Proposition 5, firms commit to inventory controls that are equal to each firm’s equilibrium sales in each stage. Inventory controls
do not restrict output on the equilibrium path, but they do act as a strategic commitment device because they constrain the firm’s off-the-equilibrium-path output.
In equilibrium, firms sell the Cournot output associated with each stage, and so
prices rise over time because demand becomes more inelastic.9 This is contrast to
the model without inventory controls in which firms prices are constant and firms
sell the Cournot quantity associated with the aggregate demand, D1 (p) + D2 (p).
The model with inventory controls does have other equilibria. In particular,
the symmetric capacity, uniform-price equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2
may still be a subgame perfect equilibrium of the inventory control game. There
are many different increasing price paths that can be supported with inventory
controls. We think that it is natural for firms to coordinate on the Cournot quantities.

6

Extensions

6.1

Product Differentiation

Introducing product differentiation does not alter the firms’ incentives to attempt
to shift demand to their competitors in Stage 1 when demand becomes more
inelastic over time. However, product differentiation does make shifting demand
9

We could have assumed that firms commit to observable inventory controls before setting their
price. In this case inventory controls would serve the same purpose, but also place an observable
limit on the firm’s own sales which reduces the firm’s return from price cutting. While this means
that the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is undoubtedly different, Proposition 5 still holds
– if each firm sets an inventory control equal to the Cournot output, then firms would clearly set
Cournot prices, and no unilateral inventory control deviation could increase profits.
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more costly. When products are homogeneous, a small price increase shifts every
consumer to the rivals. With differentiated products, any price increase will shift
fewer consumers to the rivals, and the profit increase in Stage 2 will be smaller.
Product differentiation also introduces increased complexity, so to illustrate its
impact, we focus our attention on two firms in a symmetric environment. We
provide intuition instead of analyzing the equilibrium of the model. We maintain
the assumption that capacity is sufficiently small so that firms always set marketclearing prices in Stage 2.
Figure 3: Intertemporal Price Discrimination as a Function of Product Differentiation
(b) Competition vs. Joint-Profit Maximization

Price level

Price elasticity at p

firms' period 1 price
firms' period 2 price

Price difference across periods

(a) Prices Across Periods

eD(p)
Degree of product differentiation

p2 p1 competition model
p2 p1 joint-profit maximization model

Degree of product differentiation

Notes: Example constructed using a random utility model (logit) with two firms and two periods. Product differentiation
is increasing towards the right of the plots. (a) The light dashed line corresponds to the own-price elasticity for a constant
price offered by both firms. As products become increasingly differentiated, the difference between p1 and p2 increases. (b)
Shows the change in price (p2 − p1 ) of competition model versus the joint-profit maximization model. Prices are flatter in
the competition model, as the gap between the two models grows with the degree of differentiation.

Product differentiation results in equilibrium subgame prices that are no longer
uniform over time; however, prices are flatter for any amount of product differentiation than the joint-profit-maximizing prices (see Figure 3 for an example, where
the left plot shows increasing differences in prices across periods as product differentiation increases). To see this, consider two firms, A and B, and let the inverse
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demand functions be PA1 qA1 , qB1 , PB1 qA1 , qB1 , PA2 qA2 , qB2 , and PB2 qA2 , qB2 . Joint-profitmaximizing firms would set marginal revenue
equal to the shadow cost of capacity


j j −j
 j −j 
∂Pi qt ,qt
j
j
in each of the four product markets, so
q
+P
= λ, ∀t = 1, 2; j = A, B.
j
t
t qt , qt
∂qt

Suppose that the joint-profit-maximizing prices are increasing over time.
Contrast these prices with the prices that would be set by two competing
firms given the same initial capacity. If Firm A sets a higher price than the jointprofit-maximizing firm, it will sell less in Stage 1 and hence, more in Stage 2.
Sales for Firm B are higher in Stage 1, and it has less to sell in Stage 2; thus, in
Stage 2, its price is higher, and Firm A’s demand is higher. Because it ignores
the loss for Firm B, Firm A has an incentive to set a higher first-period price
than the joint-profit-maximizing monopolist. Firm B has a similar incentive. In
equilibrium, both firms’ prices will be flatter relative to joint-profit-maximizing
prices (see the right panel in Figure 3). It is also worth noting that prices might
still be perfectly flat if sufficiently many consumers were indifferent between the
firms—a symmetric increasing price equilibrium does not exist because either firm
could strictly increase profits with an arbitrarily small price increase.

6.2

Many Periods

An obvious limitation of the paper is that we consider only two pricing periods.
Extending the model without inventory controls to more than two periods is
difficult because stronger assumptions are required in order to ensure firms play
pure strategies on and off the equilibrium path. In addition, it is difficult to find
sufficient conditions that rule out asymmetric equilibria. However, we use an
example to show that Proposition 5 can be generalized to many periods.
Instead of strengthening Assumption 1, we assume isoelastic demand, i.e.,
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p(q) = q1/ , because, with isoelastic demand, even the monopolist’s marginal revenue is always positive. That is, p(q) + p0 (q)q = (1 + 1/)q1/ > 0, if  > 1. In any
equilibrium, firms must sell all of their capacity. Consider any vector of capacities K and a sequence of isoelastic demands satisfying |t | strictly increasing in
t, for t = 1, . . . , T. If the game has only one pricing period, demand is equal to
p(q) = q1/T , and firms set the marketing clearing price for all K.
Now proceed by induction.10 Suppose that for all K, there exists an equilibrium
of the s-period pricing game (the final s periods) in which firms sell all of their
capacity and equalize their marginal revenue across periods. This clearly holds
for s = 1. We now show that it follows that for all K, there exists an equilibrium of
the s + 1-period pricing game in which firms sell all of their capacity and set prices
and inventory controls that equalize their marginal revenue across periods.
First, there clearly exists a unique vector of inventory controls for period 1
that equalizes marginal revenue between period 1 and the remaining s periods
for all firms. That is, letting kti denote firm i’s inventory control and sales in
P j
P j
period t, the inventory controls are uniquely defined by kti p0 ( j kt ) + p( j kt ) =
P j
P j
kτi p0 ( j kτ ) + p( j kτ ), ∀t, τ, i.
Second, if each firm chooses these inventory controls and sets the marketclearing price in period 1 then no deviation is profitable. No deviation in the
inventory control is profitable. In addition, no price decrease is profitable because
the firm would sell more at the low price in period 1 and sell less in every period
that has a higher price; so what remains is to show that no price increase is
profitable. We consider both rationing rules.
10

As in the two-period model, total demand grows as each period is added in the inductive
proof, but we could also have held total demand fixed and divided demand into more discrete
periods.
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Under the proportional rationing rule, the residual demand on the inverse
 i
j
P
k
q
demand curve is p1 Z where Z = 1 − j,i 1 j . At equal prices, firm i’s marginal
D1 (p1 )

revenue on this demand curve is the same as firm i’s marginal revenue p1 (q), so
deviating to a higher price implies that the period 1 marginal revenue is higher
than marginal revenue in every other period. Therefore, profits are lower and no
deviation to a higher price is profitable under proportional rationing.
Under the efficient rationing rule, the residual demand on the inverse demand


P
j
curve is p1 qi + j,i k1 . At equal prices, firm i’s marginal revenue on this demand
curve is strictly higher than on p1 (q), so deviating to a higher price implies that
the period 1 marginal revenue is higher than the marginal revenue in every other
period. Therefore, profits are lower and no deviation to a higher price is profitable
under efficient rationing.

6.3

Aggregate Demand Uncertainty

Inventory controls are generally described as a tool for managing demand uncertainty, so it is useful to describe how the model could be extended to include such
uncertainty. We describe how our results may generalize when firms must set
price before demand is realized.
To generate intuition, we begin by describing a potential extension in which
aggregate demand is uncertain only in Stage 1. That is, firms set the Stage 1
prices before learning the Stage 1 demand, and then firms set prices in Stage 2 that
clear the market. This sort of (slow) updating has been documented in the airline
industry (Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams, 2021).
Suppose that the number of consumers in Stage 1 can be either high or low,
and that the consumers in Stage 1 are known to have more elastic demand than
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consumers in Stage 2. A monopolist choosing prices and capacity optimally would
like to set a lower price in Stage 1 than in Stage 2, but it would also like to limit
sales in Stage 1 to reserve sufficient capacity for Stage 2 in the event that Stage
1 demand is unexpectedly high. This is why inventory controls are useful for a
monopolist—they protect the firm from unwanted excess sales due high demand
shocks when prices are relatively low.
Clearly the monopoly prices are not an equilibrium with competing firms—
even if the competing firms have the same capacity as the monopolist—because
the monopoly prices increase over time, and competing firms prefer to sell more of
their capacity in Stage 2 when the expected price is relatively higher. Any firm can
shift a discrete amount of its Stage 1 sales to its rival through an arbitrarily small
price increase in its Stage 1 price. Therefore, the expected price in Stage 2 must be
equal to the price charged in Stage 1 in any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
In this stylized setting, a monopolist benefits from inventory controls because
aggregate demand is uncertain. In the oligopoly setting, firms benefit from inventory controls both because they facilitate intertemporal price discrimination and
because aggregate demand is uncertain.
Next, suppose demand is uncertain in both the first and second periods and
that prices are set each period before demand is observed. We assume that Stage
2 demand is either high or low and consider two scenarios for optimal Stage 2
pricing. First, suppose that a monopolist would choose a Stage 2 price at which
the market clears when demand is low. There is no excess capacity when demand
is low, but excess demand when demand is high. In so doing, the firm forgoes
some potentially higher-priced sales to reduce the risk of unsold capacity. With
competition, the strategic considerations explored in this paper are still present in
this scenario—competing firms will want to shift at least some early-period sales
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to rivals to increase their later-period sales at higher prices. Therefore, our main
results generalize. Second, suppose that a monopolist would choose a Stage 2
price that results in excess capacity in Stage 2 when demand is low. In so doing,
the firm forgoes sales when demand is low in order to increase margins when
demand is high. In this case, second-period competition is difficult to model and
it is unclear whether or not our main insights still hold. In particular, payoffs will
depend on the rationing rule, and competing firms will adopt mixed strategies
in Stage 2 since otherwise a small price decrease would strictly increases a firm’s
sales when demand is low. This is a promising area for future research.

6.4

Discounting

In our baseline model, we abstract from the effects of discounting by assuming
that all consumers pay at the time of consumption. It is worthwhile considering
how Lemma 3 would change if payments were made at the time of purchase, and
both firms and consumers discount the future. First, it is easy to see that if the
discount factor is the same for all players, then equilibrium prices would increase
over time. Equilibrium prices would be the prices that made consumers (and
firms) indifferent between purchasing in period 1 or period 2. Hence, Lemma 3
would need to be modified to state the prices are no longer uniform, but that
equilibrium prices make consumers indifferent between purchasing in Stage 1
and Stage 2. However, this implies that firms are not engaging in intertemporal
price discrimination.
Note that a uniform-price equilibrium may exist in which all consumers postpone their purchases until Stage 2. In such an equilibrium, all sales take place at
the same price (and Stage 1 prices are not uniquely defined). The conditions under

26

which this equilibrium exists would be essentially identical to Assumption 3.
If the firms’ discount factor is higher than the consumers’ discount factor, then
the only symmetric equilibrium would be a uniform-price equilibrium in which
all purchases take place in Stage 2, as this is Pareto improving. Again, firms’
Stage 1 prices are not uniquely defined, but transacted prices are uniform. This
equilibrium requires Assumption 3.

7

Conclusion

We establish that inventory controls can facilitate intertemporal price discrimination in an oligopoly. When a single firm serves the market, and demand becomes
more inelastic over time, then the firm can clearly charge higher prices to latearriving consumers. However, in our oligopoly model, strong competitive forces
arise that prevent increasing prices over time. Individually, firms have an incentive
to move their capacity to the period with a highest price. Consequently, firms will
compete until prices are equalized over time, even though each firm has market
power, and firms would collectively earn higher profits if prices were increasing.
In order to coordinate on increasing prices when late-arriving consumers have
higher willingness to pay, firms must shield themselves from these strong competitive forces. We show that firms commit to caps on their sales each period by
adopting inventory controls. This strategy increases profits and allows prices to
rise over time. We hypothesize that capacity-constrained firms have adopted inventory controls in order to soften price competition and engage in intertemporal
price discrimination.
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A

Appendix

Derivation of cL in Assumption 1:
Formally, we implicitly define Kmax (c) by Πm (Kmax (c), c) = 0, where Πm denotes
Stage 0 profits for a monopolist as a function of its capacity choice, or
Πm (K, c) =

max

q1 ,q2 ;q1 +q2 ≤K



P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (q2 )q2 − cK .

(6)

By the implicit function theorem and the generalized envelope theorem,
∂Πm (Kmax (c), c)/∂c
Kmax (c)
dKmax (c)
= − m max
,
=−
dc
c+λ
∂Π (K (c), c)/∂K

(7)

where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint q1 + q2 ≤ K. Therefore, Kmax
is a continuous, decreasing function. It is also true that
lim Kmax (c) > argmax P1 (q1 )q1 + argmax P2 (q2 )q2 ,
c→0

q1

(8)

q2

and
lim Kmax (c) = 0.

c→∞

(9)

Therefore, there exists a unique, strictly positive capacity cost, cL , satisfying
argmax P2 (q)q = Kmax (cL ).

(10)

q

Since the monopolist’s optimal capacity choice must be less than Kmax (cL ) when
c ≥ cL , it follows that if c ≥ cL , then the monopolist sells all of its remaining capacity
in Stage 2, regardless of how much of its capacity it sells in Stage 1.
31

Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Suppose not, then so some firm with positive capacity is charging a price
not equal to the market-clearing price. Clearly, trade must take place at that price
since otherwise profits are negative.
Suppose that some firm sets a price strictly below the market-clearing price
with strictly positive probability. Let pL be the lowest such price. Clearly, a firm
setting a price equal to pL sells all of its capacity since pL is below the marketclearing price. Then, D1 (pL ) + D2 (pL ) exceeds the combined capacity of every firm
because pL is below the market clearing price, and the market-clearing price is
P
defined by D1 (p) + D2 (p) = i Ki , and both demand functions are strictly decrease
in p. Therefore, D1 (pL ) + D2 (pL ) exceeds the capacity of the firm or firms setting a
price equal to pL . But, this implies that there exists a price strictly higher than pL at
which a firm setting a price equal to pL would also sell all of its capacity, which is a
contradiction. So all firms are charging a price greater than or equal to the market
clearing price.
Now suppose that some firm sets a price strictly greater than the marketclearing price with strictly positive probability. Let pH be the highest such price.
Because industry capacity is equal to demand at the market-clearing price, and
all firms are charging a price greater than or equal to the market-clearing price, it
follows that at least one firm charging pH does not sell all of its capacity. If two or
more firms set a price equal to pH with strictly positive probability, then a firm that
does not sell all of its capacity can strictly increase profits by decreasing its price
to pH − , which is a contradiction.
If only one firm charges pH with strictly positive probability, and that firm has
positive sales in Stage 1, then that firm’s revenue (all costs are sunk) is equal to
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pH RD1 (pH ; p−i , K−i ) + pH D2 (pH ) and all of the other firms’ sales are in Stage 1 only.
Alternatively, if only one firm sets a price pH with strictly positive probability and
), where
its sales are zero in Stage 1, then its revenue is equal to pH RD2 (pH ; p−i , K−i
2
is the other firms’ remaining capacity at the start of Stage 2.
K−i
2
Clearly the firm charging pH will not sell all of its capacity in either case, because
pH exceeds the market-clearing price, and the other firms are all setting prices at or
above the market-clearing price, so total consumption must be less than available
capacity.
Assume that the firm’s rivals are playing pure strategies. Under the efficient
rationing rule, if the firm has positive sales in Stage 1, then the derivative of its
revenue with respect to its price is RD1 (pH ; p−i , K−i ) + pH D01 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) + pH D02 (pH ),
which is negative because 1) RD1 (p; p−i , K−i ) < D1 (p), ∀p; 2) pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (pH ) < 0;
and 3) pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. The second and third statements are true because,
by Assumption 1, D1 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) is less than the revenue-maximizing output
(marginal revenue is positive). So, lowering price below pH increases profit, which
is a contradiction. Under the efficient rationing rule, if the firm charging pH
has zero sales in Stage 1, then the derivative of profit with respect to price is
D2 (pH ) + pH D02 (pH ), which is negative because, by Assumption 1, D2 (pH ) is less than
the revenue-maximizing output (marginal revenue is positive). So, lowering price
below pH increases profit, which is a contradiction.
Under the proportional rationing rule, if the firm charging pH has positive sales
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in Stage 1, then the derivative of profit with respect to Firm i’s price is
RD1 (p; p−i , K−i ) + pH RD01 (pH ; p−i , K−i ) + pH D2 (pH ) + D02 (pH ) =


X K j 

 


0
+
p
D
(p
)
+
D
(p
)
, (11)
pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (ph ) 1 −

H
H
2
H
2


D2 (p j ) 
j,i

which is negative because pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (pH ) < 0, and pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0.
These are both true because, by Assumption 1, D1 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) is less than the
revenue-maximizing output. So lowering price below pH increases profit, which
is a contradiction. Under the proportional rationing rule, if the firm charging pH
has zero sales in Stage 1, then the derivative of profit with respect to Firm i’s price
is
0
−i
−i
RD2 (p; p−i , K−i
2 ) + pH RD2 (pH ; p , K2 ) =


X K j 
 

2 
 + pH D0 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) , (12)
pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (ph ) 1 −
2
j

D2 (p ) 
j,i

which is negative because pH D01 (pH ) + D1 (pH ) < 0 and pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. This
is true because D1 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) is less than the revenue-maximizing output. So
lowering price below pH increases profit, which is a contradiction.
Under either rationing rule, if rivals are playing mixed strategies then the firm’s
expected profit is a weighted average of the above pure-strategy profit functions,
all of which are strictly decreasing at the price pH , so we have a contradiction. 
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Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. Suppose not. First, suppose that some firm is charging a price strictly
below the market-clearing price with positive probability. Let pL be the lowest
such price. Clearly any firm charging pL sells all of its capacity (because pL is
below the market clearing price), but then there must exist a strictly higher price at
which the same firm sells all of its capacity and earns strictly higher profits, which
is a contradiction.
Now suppose instead that some firm charges a price strictly above the marketclearing price with positive probability. Let pH be the highest such price offered.
Clearly at least one firm offering to sell at price pH does not sell all of its capacity,
because pH is above the market clearing price. If two or more firms charge pH
with strictly positive probability, then at least one of the firms does not sell all of
its capacity, and that firm can strictly increase its sales and profits by decreasing
its price to pH − , which is a contradiction. If only one firm is charging the
price pH with strictly positive probability, and if other firms are playing pure
strategies, then a firm charging pH earns revenues (or continuation profits) equal
to pH RD2 (pH ; p−i , q−i ), where p−i and q−i are the other firms’ prices and remaining
capacities.
Under the efficient rationing rule, the derivative of profit with respect to the
continuation price is RD2 (p; p−i , q−i ) + pD02 (p), which is stictly negative at p = pH
because RD2 (pH ; p−i , q−i ) < D2 (pH ) and pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. The latter is true
because D2 (pH ) is less than the remaining industry capacity (pH is above the market
clearing price) and the initial industry capacity, so, by Assumption 1, D2 (pH ) is also
less than the revenue-maximizing output. So, lowering price below pH strictly
increases profit, which is a contradiction.
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Under the proportional rationing rule, the derivative of profit with respect to



P
qj
−i
−i
0
−i
−i
0
Firm i’s price is RD2 (p; p , q )+pRD2 (p; p , q ) = pD2 (p) + D2 (p) 1 − j,i D2 (p j ) ,
which is strictly negative at p = pH because pH D02 (pH ) + D2 (pH ) < 0. This is true
because D2 (pH ) is less than the remaining industry capacity (pH is above the market
clearing price) and the initial industry capacity, so, by Assumption 1, D2 (pH ) is less
than the revenue-maximizing output. Lowering price below pH strictly increases
profit, which is a contradiction.
Finally, since a deviation is profitable regardless of what prices the rivals charge,
it follows that a deviation is profitable even when rivals’ pricing strategies are
mixed. 

Proof of Proposition 1:
Let pL = mini pi1 denote the lowest equilibrium price offered in Stage 1. Recall that
by Lemma 2 and under Assumption 1, all firms with positive remaining capacity
in the Stage 2 charge the market-clearing price. The proof of the proposition
proceeds as a series of six claims.
1) In any pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing subgame that has positive sales in both
stages, pL ≤ p2 .
If a pure strategy equilibrium exists in which pL > p2 , then all consumers who
arrive in Stage 1 must be waiting to purchase until Stage 2. So, sales are zero at pL ,
which is a contradiction.
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2) In any pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing subgame, if pL is offered by two or more
firms in Stage 1, and if sales at pL are strictly positive, then pL = p2 .
Suppose not. Then it follows that pL < p2 , by Claim 1 above. Since pL is offered
by two or more firms, let Firm i be one of these firms. Then Firm i’s continuation
n
 o



P
profit can be written as pL xi +P2 Ki − xi , where xi = min RD1 pL ; pL , j,i|p j =pL K j , Ki
is Firm i’s sales at pL .
If Firm i deviates to a slightly higher price pL + , its profit is
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where P̂2 (·) is the market clearing price in period 2, which is a continuous and
decreasing function of the total capacity remaining after Stage 1.
If xi = Ki , then Firm i’s profit is clearly higher since pL +  > pL and P̂2 (·) > pL ,
so all of Firm i’s sales are at a higher price and its sales volume does not change.
P
If, on the other hand, xi < Ki and RD1 (pL ; pL , j,i|p j =pL K j ) < Ki , then the same
deviation is still profitable for Firm i because
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since RD is decreasing in price (for either rationing rule), and so the limit of (13)
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as  goes to 0 is




X
X




 i
i
j 
j
i 


K ) .
K  + P2 K − lim RD1 (p; pL ,
pL lim RD1 p; pL ,




p↓pL
p↓pL
j
j
j,i|p =pL

j,i|p =pL

Profits are higher because the firm sells more units at p2 and fewer units at pL and
p2 > pL . A deviation is profitable, which is a contradiction.
3) If pL = p2 , then the equilibrium is a uniform-price equilibrium.
Suppose not, so some Firm j sets a price p j > pL = p2 in Stage 1. Because
consumers can wait, it follows that Firm j’s sales are zero, so the equilibrium is a
uniform-price equilibrium.
4) There exists at most one uniform-price equilibrium of the pricing subgame (the total
sales and the transaction price is unique).
Given capacities, the price and volume of sales in a uniform-price equilibrium
P
are uniquely defined because only one price satisfies D1 (p) + D2 (p) = i Ki .
5) Any pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium is either a uniform-price equilibrium
or an asymmetric price equilibrium. Either a uniform-price equilibrium exists or one or
more asymmetric price equilibria exists, but not both.
As above, consider the unique candidate uniform-price equilibrium. Suppose
this equilibrium does not exist. Then it must be that deviating in Stage 1 is
profitable. But deviating to a higher price in Stage 1 is never profitable. Consumers
prefer to wait and buy at the market clearing price in Stage 2. So deviating to a
lower price must be profitable.
If deviating from the uniform-price to a lower price in Stage 1 is profitable for
some firm, then it is clearly also profitable for the firm that has the largest capacity.
38

Let i denote the firm with the largest capacity; let pi1 denote the firm’s profitmaximizing deviation in Stage 1; and let p̂2 denote the resulting second-period
market-clearing price.
Then it follows that pi1 and p̂2 must define an asymmetric-price equilibrium.
Firm i sells in both periods (otherwise the deviation isn’t profitable) so all other
firms must sell only in Stage 2. Clearly Firm i has no incentive to deviate since by
construction pi1 is its best response to the other firms’ strategies. And if any other
firm could increase its profits by charging a price less than pi1 , then it follows that
Firm i could also increase its profit by deviating to that same price (because Firm i
has more capacity), in which case pi1 is not Firm i’s profit-maximizing price, which
is a contradiction.
Similarly, if an asymmetric price equilibrium exists, then pi1 must be the best
response for Firm i to other firms’ prices, even if they were all charging p2 in Stage
1. So a uniform-price equilibrium does not exist.
6) There exist at most n asymmetric-price equilibria.
We show that there exists, at most, one asymmetric-price equilibrium in which
Firm i is the low-priced firm in period one (or, more strictly speaking, such equilibria differ only in the prices of firms with zero sales).
In an asymmetric-price equilibrium, if Firm i is the low-price firm, then it is the
only firm with positive sales in Stage 1. Let p denote Firm i’s equilibrium price.
As in Claim 5 let pi1 denote Firm i’s best response when rival firm’s are charging
the unique uniform-price equilibrium price, which is the same as its optimal price
when rivals are setting the market clearing price in Stage 2.
However, if p > pi1 , then Firm i can profitably deviate to pi1 because regardless
of what price it sets, its rivals are selling at the market clearing price in Stage 2.
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And, if p < pi1 , then because π(p) is concave and maximized at pi1 , it follows that
Firm i is strictly better off increasing its price. So, p cannot be an asymmetric-price
equilibrium price unless p = pi1 .
Therefore, the only one asymmetric-price equilibrium that can exist in which
Firm i is the low-price firm in the first period and that equilibrium is given by (3)
and (5). Since there are n firms there are at most n asymmetric-price equilibria.

Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. We first prove Claim 1 below, which shows
the pricing subgame has a uniform-price equilibrium for at least some values of
first-stage capacity, and then we prove that the capacities chosen in equilibrium
fall within that range.
Claim 1. If demand becomes more inleastic over time, then under Assumptions 1, 2 and
if capacities satisfy

η2 (p)
Ki
> Pn
, ∀p > 0, i = 1, ..., n.
j
η1 (p)
j=1 K

(14)

then the unique subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium of the Stage 1 and Stage 2
pricing subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium.

Proof of Claim 1:
Proof. Let Ki denote each firm’s capacity, and let p̃ denote the unique uniform price
P
defined by Dtot (p̃) = D1 (p̃) + D2 (p̃) = i Ki . By Assumption 1 and Proposition 1, the
uniform-price equilibrium is unique if it exists, or no deviation is profitable.
Suppose that D1 (p̃) ≥ maxi Ki . Then a deviation to a lower price is not profitable,
because any firm that cuts its price in Stage 1 will sell all of its capacity at the lower
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deviation price and hence earn strictly lower profits.
Now suppose that D1 (p̃) < maxi Ki . Then for any Firm i such that Ki ≤ D1 (p̃), a
deviation to a lower price is not profitable by the same argument. When Ki > D1 (p̃),
then a deviation to a lower price could increase the market-clearing price in period
2, and could increase the firm’s profits, but only if demand is becoming less elastic
over time so the firms jointly prefer to set prices that increase over time.
Let Firm i be the deviating firm, and let p2 (·) denote the second-period marketclearing price as a function of remaining capacity. Firm i’s problem is to choose
a price pi < p̃, or equivalently, a quantity qi = D1 (pi ) to maximize its continuation
profit,
 n

X


 

π̂i (qi ; p̃, K) = qi p1 (qi ) + P2 
Ki − qi  Ki − qi ,

(15)

i=1



i

subject to qi ∈ D1 (p̃), Ki – higher output levels are not feasible, and lower output
levels are inconsistent with a lower first period price. The first-order condition is
 n

 n

X
X




dπ̂(qi ; p̃, K)



Ki − qi  − P02 
Ki − qi  (Ki − qi ) = 0, (16)
= P1 (qi ) + qi P01 (qi ) − P2 
dq
i=1
i=1
or
!
dπ̂(qi ; p̃, K)
1
i
= P1 (q ) 1 +
(17)
dq
η1 (P1 (qi ))
 n

!
X i

Ki − qi
1
i
P
= 0.
− P2 
K − q  1 +
 Pn i
i
η2 P2 ni=1 Ki − qi
i=1 K − q
i=1
Clearly, the objective function, equation (15), is concave, so (17) implies that a
deviation to a lower price is profitable if and only if limq↓D1 (p̃)
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dπ̂(q;p̃,K)
dq

> 0, or

equivalently, limp↑p̃

dπ̂(D1 (p);p̃,K)
dq

> 0. But clearly

!
dπ̂(D1 (p); p̃, K)
1
lim
< P1 (D1 (p̃)) 1 +
p↑p̃
dq
η1 (P1 (D1 (p̃))

 n
!
i

X i
1
K
Pn i
K − D1 (p̃) 1 +
− P2 
 Pn i
η
P
K
−
D
(
p̃)
1
2
2
i=1 K
i=1
i=1
because

Ki −q
Pn
( i=1 Ki −q)

<

PnK

i

i=1

. Since P1 (D1 (p̃)) = P2
Ki

Pn


i
K
−
D
(
p̃)
= p̃, it follows that
1
i=1

a deviation to a lower price is not profitable if
η2 (p̃)
1
1
Ki
Ki
Pn i
−
> Pn i ,
 Pn i < 0 ⇐⇒
η1 (P1 (D1 (p̃))) η2 P2 i=1 K − D1 (p̃)
η1 (p̃)
i=1 K
i=1 K

(18)

or equivalently, if Equation (14) holds.
Finally, consider a deviation to a higher price. If D1 (p̃) <

P
j,i

K j , for all i, then

no such deviation can have any effect on first or second period sales. The firms
that do not deviate can meet all of the demand at the price p̃. If, on the other
P
hand, D1 (p̃) > j,i K j , for some i, then a firm can deviate to a higher price and
have positive sales. However even a monopolist would not find such a deviation
profitable when demand is becoming less elastic over time, so no firm will deviate
to a higher price. 
We now continue the proof of Proposition 2 by showing that the Stage 0 equilibrium capacities satisfy Claim 1.
Under Assumptions 1 and 3, if a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which
every firm chooses K∗ units of capacity, then, by Claim 1, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium. Similarly, if all firm capacities in a neighborhood of K∗ , then the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the pricing subgame is a uniform-price equilibrium, so the
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first-stage profit function for Firm i can be written as





X 




j
u
i
−i

K  − c Ki ,
Π (K ; K ) = Ptot 





(19)

j

where K−i is the capacity of the other firms.
Firm i’s capacity, Ki , maximizes Firm i’s profits only if Ki = K∗ is the solution to
∂Πu (Ki ; K∗ )
= Ptot ((n − 1)K∗ + Ki ) − c + P0tot ((n − 1)K∗ + Ki )Ki = 0,
i
∂K

(20)

which is concave and therefore has a unique solution, Ki (K∗ ). Clearly Ki (K∗ ) is
decreasing in K∗ , so (20) uniquely defines a symmetric solution K∗ , and it is easy to
see that K∗ must be exactly equal to the Cournot quantity associated with n firms,
production cost c, and demand Dtot (p). So we have shown that Ki = K∗ is a local
best response. Next, we show that Ki = K∗ is the global best response when rival
firms choose K∗ .
Suppose that Ki < K∗ . If a uniform price equilibrium exists when Firm i chooses
Ki and other firms choose K∗ , then Firm i’s profits are given by (19), and so Firm
i’s profits at Ki are strictly lower than at K∗ .
If, on the other hand, a uniform-price equilibrium does not exist when Firm i
chooses Ki and other firms choose K∗ , then by Proposition 1 an asymmetric-price
equilibrium must exist. Under Assumption 3, Firm i cannot profit by deviating
from the uniform-price equilibrium even if its capacity is K∗ , so Firm i is not the
low-priced firm in the first period. The only asymmetric-price equilibrium that
can exist is one in which one of Firm i’s rivals is the firm that sells at the low price
in the first period. There are n − 1 such equilibria because any of the n − 1 firms
with capacity K∗ could set the low price in the first period.
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Firm i’s first-stage profit in all of these asymmetric-price equilibria is
h 

i
Πa (Ki ; K∗ ) = P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) − c Ki ,

(21)

where p1 is the price charged in the first period, and so p1 maximizes



D1 (p1 )p1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) K∗ − D1 (p1 ) .

(22)

Firm i’s first order-condition is
!



dp
1
P02 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) 1 − D01 (p1 ) i + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 (p1 ) − c = 0.
dK
(23)


Because p1 < p2 , D(p1 ) is greater than first-period sales at the uniform price. This
implies that n − 1 firms are each selling less than K∗ − D(p̃)/n in period 2, where p̃ is
the uniform price. In this case, ignoring the impact of Ki on p1 , Firm i’s best response
is greater than K∗ − D(p̃)/n, which implies that Ki > K∗ , which is a contradiction.
And, as Ki increases, the optimal first-period price falls (dp1 /dKi < 0). Thus,
ignoring the impact of Ki on p1 does not alter the result. Deviating to a lower Ki is
still not profitable.
Now suppose that Ki > K∗ . Again, the equilibrum of the pricing subgame
may be an asymmetric-price equilibrium or a uniform-price equilibrium. If it is a
uniform-price equilibrium, then by the same argument, profits are strictly lower.
If it is an asymmetric-price equilibrium, then it must be an asymmetric-price
equilibrium in which Firm i sets a low price in the first period. This is because
an asymmetric-price equilibrium exists only if a firm wants to deviate from the
uniform-price equilibrium, and (18) tells us that a firm wants to deviate only if
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η2 (p)/η1 (p) exceeds its share of capacity. But by Assumption 3, this happens only
if the capacity share exceeds 1/n and only Firm i’s share of capacity exceeds 1/n.
So, if Firm i deviates to Ki > K∗ , then its profit must be


 

max D1 p1 p1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − D1 p1 Ki − D1 p1 .
p1

Rewriting this as a function of quantity yields



max P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − q1 Ki − q1 .
q1

(24)

Thus, the firm’s profit in stage one is



max P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − q1 Ki − q1 − cKi ,
q1

(25)

and its maximized profit in stage one is



max P1 (q1 )q1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + Ki − q1 Ki − q1 − cKi ,
q1 ,K1

(26)

which we can rewrite using a change of variables (q2 = Ki − q1 ) as

max P1 (q1 )q1 − cq1 + P2 (n − 1)K∗ + q2 q2 − cq2 .
q1 ,q2

(27)

Therefore, q1 is the first-period monopoly output, and q2 is the second-period
best response to (n − 1)K∗ . But this is not a profitable deviation for firm i unless
p1 < p2 (otherwise both prices are lower than the uniform price), or equivalently
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the Lerner index in the first period is smaller than the Lerner index in period 2, or

P02 (n − 1)K∗ + q2 q2

<
P1 (q1 )
P2 (n − 1)K∗ + q2

(28)

q2
1
1
<
|η1 (p1 )| |η2 (p2 )| (n − 1)K∗ + q2

(29)

η2 (p2 )
q2
,
<
η1 (p1 ) (n − 1)K∗ + q2

(30)

P01 (q1 )q1

or

which violates Assumption 3 because q2 < K∗ . So, this is a contradiction. Hence
there exists no profitable deviation for any firm. 

Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 1, which shows that a pure
strategy equilibrium exists and that any pure strategy equilibrium must be a
uniform-price equilibrium or an asymmetric price equilibrium in which the Stage
1 price is strictly lower than the Stage 2 price. But if the elasticity of demand is
increasing, an asymmetric price equilibrium cannot exist. The firm selling in Stage
1 prefers to sell all of its capacity at the market clearing price in Stage 2. 

Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. By Proposition 3 all transactions take place at the same price, and by
Lemma 1 firms set the Cournot capacities as if there were one combined sales
period. 
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. Let kti denote the inventory control for Firm i in period t. Let qiC
t denote the
output of firm i in period t when firms play a sequential Cournot game.
Consider an equilibrium of the inventory control game in which, on the equilibrium path, firms choose capacity equal to the sum of the Cournot capacity in
each period, Ki = qiC
+ qiC
, set the Cournot price, pCt in each period, and then set
2
1
inventory controls equal to the Cournot output in each period, i.e., kti = qiC
t .
Clearly no deviation is profitable in the final period. That is, in every Stage
2 subgame firms set the market clearing price and set a non-binding inventory
control. This is because Lemma 2 holds, so any second-period price not equal to
the market-clearing price is less profitable. Introducing inventory controls does
not change this result.
Next, consider a deviation by Firm i to a lower price in the first selling period.
Decreasing demand elasticity implies that pC1 < pC2 , so a small decrease in its firstperiod price discontinuously increases Firm i’s first-period sales, decreases Firm
i’s second-period sales, and decreases Firm i’s profits. More generally, if Firm i
had a profitable deviation to a lower price in period one, then that price would
define an asymmetric price equilibrium, but by Proposition 1 an asymmetric-price
equilibrium does not exist. So deviating to a lower price is not profitable.
Now consider a deviation by Firm i to a higher price in the first period. Under
the efficient rationing rule, the residual demand function facing the deviating firm
is RDi1 (pi ; p−i1 , q−i1 ) = D1 (p)−(n−1)qC1 . This is because of the rival firms’ inventory
j

j

controls, k1 = qC1 (if any firm deviates in stage zero, then k1 equals the Cournot
output given the new capacity constraint).
Since the shadow cost of capacity is c on the equilibrium path (and, more
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generally, is equalized across periods), Firm i’s first-period profit function is
(D1 (pi ) − (n − 1)qC1 )(pi − c) or, equivalently, (p1 ((n − 1)qC1 + qi ) − c)qi where p1 is
the first period inverse demand function. Thus, the optimal price deviation is
given by the first-order condition, which is




P01 (n − 1)qC1 + q q + P1 (n − 1)qC1 + q = c.
But this implies that q = qC1 and that the optimal price and quantity is the firstperiod Cournot output (or, more generally, is the output that equalizes the marginal
revenue across the two periods), so no deviation to a higher price is profitable.
Under the proportional rationing rule, the deviating firm’s residual demand
function is

"
RDi1 (pi ; pC1 , qC1 )

= D1 (p ) 1 −
i

(n − 1)qC1
D1 (pC1 )

#
=

1
D1 (pi ),
n

since D1 (pC1 ) = nqC1 . The shadow cost of capacity is c on the equilibrium path (and,
more generally, is equalized across the two periods), so Firm i’s first-period profit
function is n1 D1 (p)(p − c), or equivalently, p1 (nq) − cq. The first-order condition is


P1 nq + P01 nq q = c, which implies that q = qC1 , so no deviation to a higher price
is profitable.
In Stage zero, firms choose capacity expecting to equalize marginal revenue
across periods, so Ki = qC1 + qC2 is a best response to K j = qC1 + qC2 for all j , i. 
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